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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
llELFIN E. ORTEGA, 
Plaintiff and Respondent_, 
vs. 
PERRY A. THOMAS, 
Defendant and .Appellant. 
Case 
No. 9709 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
S'fATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff, as prevailing party below, sharply dis-
putes defendant's Statement of Facts, which reads as 
though defendant were the prevailing party. 
There were three eyewitnesses to the accident who 
were not in either car, and all of them flatly testified 
that defendant ran a red light and ran broadside into 
plaintiff's car. 
Peggy Lynn Day followed defendant over the 
'viaduct in her car. She estimated his speed going 
through the 3rd West intersection at 20-25 miles per 
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hour (R. 178, 196). At that intersection and going 
across the viaduct she maintained a distance behind him 
of about 2-21j2 car lengths, and a similar speed, and 
estimated his speed at impact as being about 25 miles 
per hour (R. 178, 191, 193). Coming off of the viaduct, 
Mrs. Day slowed both because she wished to make a 
right turn at 5th West and because the light there was 
red against her and defendant. Even so she was 208 feet 
behind him at impact, which indicates that defendant 
was going faster at impact than she thought (R. 181, 
182, 190, 193, 197, 198). From the time the defendant 
started down from the viaduct until the collision, the 
light was red against him (R. 181-182). The impact was 
severe, spinning plaintiff's car around (R. 184, 185, 195, 
196). 
Joe Archibeque testified that he followed plaintiff's 
car in his car, southward on 5th West, approaching the 
North Temple Intersection ( R. 205-207) . The light 
was green for plaintiff as he entered the intersection and 
at the impact (R. 207). Defendant hit plaintiff hard 
enough to knock plaintiff's car in a complete circle 
(R. 221, 234). He estimated defendant's speed at 30-
40 miles per hour (R. 241, 242), and plaintiff's at 10 
miles per hour (R. 205-207). Mr. Archibeque himself 
didn't appreciate danger and was almost involved in the 
collision too (R. 208, 209, 230, 235). 
The third eyewitness, Bob Garcia, was on the roof 
of a corner apartment building at the time of the colli-
Sion (R. 245). He stated that plaintiff had the green 
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light at in1pact ( R. 249), and the speed of defendant 
was -t:>-50 rniles per hour ( R. 250, 258), and plaintiff's 
20 rniles per hour (R. 250). 
Salt Lake City Police Officer Carl N emelka, testi-
fied that defendant left 30 feet of brake marks from all 
four wheels prior to impact, and 24 feet of veer marks 
after impact (R. 108, 110). He placed the point of im-
pact as 37 feet from the east curb of 5th West and 
26 feet from the north curb of North Temple (R. 106), 
which is almost in the center of the intersection, in the 
northwest quarter. 
Salt Lake City Police Officer Oscar Hendrickson 
testified that, after taking statements from the defen-
dant, he reran defendant's route at the speeds indicated 
by defendant. In more than six tries, he came to a red 
light against defendant every time (R. 160-162). 
Plaintiff, testifying in his own behalf, said that at 
6:20 a.m., he left his home at 624 \Vest 3rd North, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, to go to work (R. 357, 358). Driving 
south on 5th \Vest, he slowed for a red light at North 
Temple, and when he was close to the north pedestrian 
lane and gqing four or five miles an hour the light 
turned green and he proceeded on into the intersection. 
As the light changed he looked east, saw defendant's car 
approaching, but it was so far away that he didn't view 
it as a hazard (R. 358-361). He looked both ways, 
and then, looking east again, saw defendant's car very 
close to him, tried to speed up, but hadn't time to get 
clear and the collision followed (R. 361, 362, 371, 372). 
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For defendant, testimony was offered by the defen-
dant himself and his brother Larry. The brother testi-
fied that· he didn't know the defendant's speed, see 
plaintiff prior to the accident, or see the traffic light 
prior to impact, although he did look at it inimediately 
after the impact and said it was then green for defen-
dant (R. 482-484). 
Defendant testifying in his own behalf, fixed his 
speeds at all points approaching the intersection from 
two blocks back with precision, but was unable to state 
his speed when he applied his brakes or at impact (R. 
453, 454). His car travelled about 72 feet during his 
reaction time, which would indicate a speed of over 45 
miles per hour, just before he braked (R. 457). He said 
that he first saw the traffic light when he was near the 
top of the 5th West side of the viaduct, which would 
be about 400 feet from the intersection, and that the 
light was then red (R. 441, 442), but changed to green 
when he was about 7 5 feet from the· intersection ( R. 
443). On cross examination he admitted that on the day 
of the accident he gave Officer Hendrickson a written 
statement in which he said he first saw the light about 
75 feet from the intersection and didn't see it coming 
off the viaduct ( R. 464, 469) . 
There was a passenger, Delbert Schuller, in defen-
dant's car, at the time of the accident. Defendant made 
no effort to have him present in court or have his depo-. 
sition taken, although they had been shipmates (R. 
477-479) . This might be because Mr. Schuller could 
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have been the occupant of defendant's car who immedi-
ately after the accident, and before anyone got out of 
defendant's car, was the author of a comment to defen-
dant "'\Thy didn't you stop?" (R. 223). 
THE JURY WAS ADEQUATELY IN-
STRUCTED. 
The instructions, taken as a whole, properly advised 
the jury as to the theories of the parties and the law 
applicable to the case. 
Defendant claims prejudicial error because the 
trial court submitted separate instructions on the issues 
of defendant's negligence and approximate cause and 
plaintiff's contributory negligence and proximate cause. 
These instructions are stated correctly at pages 4-6 of 
defendant's brief. (Instrs. 12 and 14, R. 56, 58). Defen-
dant contends that they should have been merged into 
one instruction. 
The pertinent facts are: 
( 1) The jury was instructed to consider the In-
structions as a whole ( Instrs. 1 and 40, R. 44, 84) . 
( 2) Contributory negligence was presented as an 
issue in the opening statements, the four days of testi-
mony, the instructions, the closing arguments, and the 
additional instruction (Additional Designation to 
Record). 
( 3) Contributory negligence was clearly covered 
in the Instructions. It formed a sandwich around In-
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struction 12, being given in Instruction 14, and in 
Instruction 11 (R. 55), which stated that the favored 
driver was contributorily negligent if he failed to observe 
danger when he should have and had then an oppor-
tunity to avoid it. It is defined also in Instruction 4B 
(R. 47). Instructions 8, 9, 10, 17, 19, 20, 21 and 22 deal, 
in whole or in part, with the duties of favored drivers, 
all to the benefit of defendant in light of the evidence. 
( 4) The defendant made no request for a definitive 
instruction on contributory negligence, nor to point out 
to the court that he wanted Instruction 14 appended 
to Instruction 12. 
( 5) Instruction 12 and 14 were not formula instruc-
tions, but only statements of the theories of each party 
and the jury was specifically so advised by the court in 
the additional instruction which read "The instructions 
(12 and 14) that you asked about do set out the law 
applicable to the opposite theories of each party. You 
should follow the instruction which you think is sup-
ported by the preponderance of the evidence (Additional 
Designation to Record. Emphasis added.) 
Under these facts, the giving of Instruction 12, 
did not constitute prejudicial error. 
The basic rule of law is that if the instructions as a 
whole present the theories of the parties with fair 
accuracy, the trial was fair and the jury verdict sup-
ported by substantial evidence, then the verdict will be 
affirmed, even though there are errors in the instructions. 
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Nelson v .... t\..rrowhead Freight Lines, 99 Utah 
129, 104 P.2d 225. 
Fowler v. Medical Arts Building, 112 Utah 367, 
188 P.2d 711, 716-718. 
State v. Guerts, 11 Utah 2d 345, 359 P.2d 12. 
Clark v. Los Angeles and Salt Lake R. Co., 73 
Utah 486, 275 P. 582. 
Crellin v. Thomas, 122 Utah 122, 247 P.2d 264. 
Rule 61, U.R.C.P. 
The giving of a "formula" type instruction has 
been often considered by the Utah Supreme Court. 
While sometimes disapproved of, there has been no 
reversal on that ground alone. 
Defendant's prime case of Ivie v. Richardson~ 9 
Utah 2d 5, 336 P.2d 781, is a recent example. There the 
court indicated that a "formula" instruction might con-
fuse the jury, be argumentative, or partial. The court 
used mild language- "It is better to avoid giving such 
instructions," and went on to say, "Of more importance 
is the (next) error assigned . . . " (at 336 P .2d 786) . 
Sorenson v. Bell~ 51 Utah 262, 170 P. 72, is similar 
and cited with approval in I vie v. Richardson, supra. It 
discusses a formula instruction on contributory negli-
gence with a built in error of allowing a verdict against 
plaintiff without finding him negligent. Even so, the 
court stated, "If the foregoing were the only error com-
plained of, however, we should not, in view of the whole 
charge, in which the court more clearly and correctly 
stated the rights and duties of deceased, feel inclined to 
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reverse the judgment. There is however, a further 
assignment of error which is more serious." 
Cromeenes v. San Pedro L.A. ~ S.L.R. Co.~ 37 
Utah 475, 109 P. 10, is a case where a formula instruc-
tion omitted contributory negligence although it was 
definitely an issue. Verdict for plaintiff was affirmed, 
because the instructions as a whole correctly stated the 
law. Other Utah cases dealing with formula or formula 
type instructions, all of which are in accord with the 
above, are: 
Toone v. J. P. O'Neil Construction Co., 40 Utah 
265, 121 p. 1016. 
Morgan v. Mammoth Mining Co., 26 Utah 174, 
72 P. 68~. 
Jensen v. Utah Ry. Co., 72 Utah 366, 270 P. 349 
(reversed on other grounds) . 
Jensen v. Logan City, et al, 89 Utah 347, 373, 
57 P.2d 708. 
Fox v. Taylor, 10 Utah 2d 174, 350 P.2d 154. 
The rationale for such decisions is set forth in Mor-
rison v. Perry~ 104 Utah 151, 140 P.2d 772, which states 
that it is proper to give the jury separate instructions 
setting forth the theories and applicable law of each 
party, and directing the jury to find for the one sup-
ported by proper evidence. The distinction between such 
instructions and formula instructions is so narrow, if 
extant at all, that it is difficult to approve the one and 
reverse the other. 
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In this case, the judge gave the instructions of each 
party. Instruction 12 is plaintiff's requested instruction 
No. 9 (R. 10). Instruction 14 is defendant's requested 
instruction No. 7 ( R. 27). Each correctly stated the 
theory of each party and the judge, presumptively, 
coul~ have felt that he had done his full duty, having 
also advised the jury to consider the instructions as a 
whole, without singling out any one of them ( R. 84) • 
THE RULING OF THE TRIAL JUDGE, 
IN DENYING DEF'ENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR NE'V TRIAL,_ WAS PROPER AND 
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
Defendant's Motion for New Trial (R. 91, 92), 
as argued and briefed for the trial court, was based on 
possible confusion of the jury arising from the dis-
crepancy between Instructions 12 and 14, that is that 
the jury c01npletely ignored the issue of contributory 
negligence in arriving at its verdict. 
As pointed out in the Statement of Facts, the 
evidence of defendant's negligence was so overwhelm-
ing, that contributory negligence and the amount of 
datnages were the only real issues in the case. Contrib-
utory negligence had been covered in every phase of the 
case, ran repeatedly through the Instructions both as 
such and on the many· instructions dealing with the 
duties <;>f favored drivers, and occupied a great part of 
the time of the closing arguments, and again in the 
additional instruction (Additional Designation of Rec-
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ord), that stated that Instructions 12 and 14 were the 
statements of the theories of the parties and were on an 
equal footing. Under these circumstances it would be 
incredible that contributory negligence could have been 
ignored~ 
The trial judge who was the observer of all the 
proceedings squarely met the issue, found no confusion 
of the jury, and denied the Motion for New Trial 
(R. 93). 
In so ruling the trial judge acted within his dis-
cretion and should be sustained. 
Rule 59, U.R.C.P. 
Crellin v. Thomas, supra. 
Uptown Appliance Company v. Flint, 122 Utah 
298, 240 p .2d 826. 
State Road Commission v. Christensen, 13 Utah 
2d 224, 371 p .2d 552. 
Redd v. Airway Motor Coach Lines, 104 Utah 
9, 137 P.2d 374. 
Burton v. Z.C.M.I., 122 Utah 360, 249 P.2d 514. 
Fox v. Taylor, supra. 
Mazzotta v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 153 P.2d 
338 (California case dealing with omission of 
contributory negligence from "formula" in-
struction. Held that prejudice in such case 
arising from effect of instructions on jury 
was matter observable by trial judge, and his 
ruling on the point would not be disturbed). 
10 
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1\NY CL.Al~l OF ERROR Tll.AT DE-
FEND.A.NT :\liGHT HAVE HAD IN RE-
CAil-D TO INSTRUCTIONS 12 .A.ND 14, HAS 
BEEN 'VAlVED BY HIS NEITHER TAK-
ING .AN OPPORTUNITY TO CORRECT 
SUCH ERROR, NOR OBJECTING TO THE 
INSTRUCTION OF THE COURT WHICH 
ATTEMPTED TO RECONCILE SUCH IN-
STRUCTIONS. 
When the jury first went out. to deliberate, defen-
dant took his Exceptions to the Instructions, and in-
cluded an exception to Instruction 12 as being an in-
complete "for1nula" instruction. Thereafter, the jury 
asked for assistance in reconciling Instructions 12 and 
14. The defendant joined with the court and plaintiff in 
drafting the explanatory instruction which was given 
to the jury, advising them that Instructions 12 and 14 
were merely the statements of the theories of the parties, 
and that they should be guided in regard to them by 
the evidence. The defendant took no exception to this 
instruction, stipulated that it be given, and proposed no 
alternative. Transcript of this proceeding is included 
in the Record on Appeal as the Additional Designation 
of Record. 
It should be noted in passing that while t~e addi-
tional instruction met the problem of an incomplete 
"formula", that plaintiff does not necessarily concede 
that this was the problem faced by the jury. The In-
structions, due to plaintiff's error of omission do not 
11 
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state that the defendant carried the burden of proof 
on contributory negligence. The jury might well have 
been wondering if plaintiff had to prove himself not 
negligent. This would be difficult because plaintiff was 
almost valueless as a witness for himself (R. 357-362, 
369-372) . The additional instruction also answer~d this 
question by directing the jury to follow the preponder-
ance of the evidence on both instructions. 
It is not proper that counsel can, by taking a simple 
exception after the jury has been charged, put an error 
in his pocket so that he has two chances of winning, by 
verdict or by reversal. He has a positive duty to assist 
the court and raise his points. 53 Am. Jur. Trial~ Sec. 
513, Page 415-416, Redd v. Airway Motor Coach Lines~ 
supra~ Palfreyman v. Bates ~ Rogers Construction 
Company~ 108.Utah 142, 158 P.2d 132. 
If the additional instruction be imperfect, or not 
cure the error of which defendant complains, then he 
irrevocably put aside his claim of error by stipulating 
that it be given, without effort at giving an instruction 
which would suit him, and taking no exception thereto. 
Rule 47(n}, U.R.C.P. 
State v. Kessler, 15 Utah 142, 49 P. 293. 
McCall v. Kendrick, 2 Utah 2d 364, 274 P.2d 
962. 
Devine v. Cook, 3 Utah 2d 134, 279 P.2d 1073. 
Ludlowv. Los Angeles and Salt Lake Ry. Co., 
73 Utah 513, 275 P. 593. 
12 
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IIofrichter v. 1\::iewit, Neb., 2:.? NW 2d. 703, 164 
A.L.R. 1256. 
53 An1. Jur. Trial, Sees. 941-948, pages 667-670. 
"IRREGULARITY OF THE PROCEED-
INGS" ~I1-\.Y NOT BE USED ON APPEAL 
AS A GROUND FOR NEW TRIAL, 'VHEN 
SUCH ISSUE HAD NEVER BEEN PUT 
BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT FOR A 
RULING. 
Defendant's brief at pages 16-20 correctly states 
the trial proceedings (T. 133-136), concerning a com-
ment of the court that a police officer who had investi-
gated an automobile accident scene was "an expert in 
his own sphere" and, while capable of testifying as to 
physical evidence he found, was not capable of evalu-
ating it. 
The only action taken by the trial court thereafter, 
favored the defendant. On a prompt objection being 
taken to the comment, the court immediately advised 
the jury to disregard it, and to weigh for themselves 
the testimony of the officer ( T. 134-136) . 
During the trial, defendant at no time moved for 
a mistrial. 
After trial, defendant's Motion for New Trial 
merely recited Rule 59 (a), U.R.C.P., verbatim and 
without any particulars (R. 91, 92). The incident would 
come within Rule 59 (a) ( 1) "Irregularity of the Pro-
13 
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ceedings . . . ", and an explanatory affidavit "shall" be 
filed on such ground with the Motion for New Trial. 
Rule 59 (c), U.R.C.P. Howard v. Howard, 11 Utah 
2d 149, 356 P.2d 275. The affidavit was not filed, so this 
issue was not before the trial court as a ground for a new 
trial, and the record shows no ruling on it. Prejudice 
arising from error or irregularity in proceedings is best 
decided by the trial judge, who will be reversed only in 
case of abuse of discretion, Burton v. Z.C.M.I._, 122 
Utah 360, 249 P.2d 514, and such issue must be squarely 
presented to him for ruling before it can be used on 
appeal. Law v. Smith_, 34 Utah 394, 98 P. 800, State 
Road Commis$ion v. Chri$tensen_, 13 Utah 2d 224, 371 
P.2d 552. 
THE COMMENT OF THE TRIAL 
JUbGE CONCE:RNING THE EXPERTNESS 
OF OFFICER NEMELKA WAS NOT PRE-
JUDICIAL IN NATURE NOR EFFECT. 
Comments on evidence by the trial judge are not 
presumptively prejudicial error when they concern facts 
not in dispute, or of common knowledge and no pre-
judice appears. Fox v. Taylor_, 10 Utah 2nd 174, 350 
P.2d 154, Federated Milk Producers A.ssn. Inc. v. 
Statewide Plumbing and Heating Co._, 11 Utah 2d 295, 
358 P.2d 348, Douglas v. Do'ltVall_, 5 Utah 2d 429, 304 
P.2d 373. . 
Possibly the reason that no affidavit was filed with 
the Motion for New Trial, is that there was no conflict 
14 
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on the evidence. The court had said "The Court does 
believe that this officer is an expert in his own sphere 
and I have allowed him to testif.tf as to the solid brake 
marks prior to the change in direction. After that point, 
I don't believe this officer is trained to evaluate the evi-
dence as he found it." (T. 134). The Court's comment 
referred to the brake marks prior to impact, and the 
defendant agreed with the officer on that point: 
"Q (By Mr. King) All right. Now, the 
officer has testified that you left 30 feet of brake 
marks before the impact occurred. From your 
observation would you say that this was correct? 
A Yes, sir, about." (T. 450) 
It is a matter of common knowledge that a police 
officer is experienced in accident investigation. Officer 
N emelka testified that during 41/2 years l}e had investi-
gated 1500-1600 traffic accidents (T. 102, 113). His 
ability to report the physical evidence at the accident 
scene was not challenged. He was fully qualified as a 
practical expert. Webb v. Olin Mathieson Chemical 
Corp.~ 9 Utah 2d 275, 342 P.2d 1094. It is difficult to 
see how the court's comment added anything to his sta-
ture as a witness, particularly when it was phrased so as 
to limit his field of competence, not to enhance it. 
No prejudice appears ordinarily when a court 
simply advises counsel as to the basis of a ruling, for 
the purpose of letting counsel know permissible areas 
of examination of a witness. This does not have the im-
- ·. 
pact that a comment put bluntly to the jury for their 
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consideration would have. Heitfield v. Benevolent P. 0. 
of K.~ 220 P .2d 655 (Wash.), 53 Am. J ur. Trial, Sec. 
79. Testimony in this case took four full days. It would 
be almost impossible for the court to avoid some refer-
ence to the witnesses or testimony in that time. The 
problem is comparable to trying to give adequate in-
structions without reference to facts. Such reference is 
permissible. Fox v. Taylor, supra. 
After making the comment the court immediately 
advised the jury to disregard it and make its own deci-
sions on witnesses and weight of evidence, and then 
repeated this in the Instructions (R. 34, 35, 78, 79, 81-
84). These are correct and adequate ways of curing 
problems of this type. Lindsay Land ~ Livestock v. 
Smart Land and Livestock~ 43 Utah 554, 137 P. 837. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that no prejudicial 
error appears, and that accordingly the verdict of the 
jury and denial of defendant's Motion for New Trial 
should be affirmed, and plaintiff recover his costs herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
K. SAMUEL KING 
A. ttorney for Plaintiff 
16 
315 East 2nd South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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